A core problem facing movement scientists is how to define the term "intentional movement" (e.g., Davids et al. 2001). The aim of this paper is to get a clearer grasp on how to define this term through a conceptual analysis. To reach this aim, the paper discusses two related terms, that is, i) "intentional movement" (without capitalization) understood in an ordinary sense, and ii) "Intentional Movement" (with capitalization; cf. Searle 1983) understood in a technical, philosophical sense. To show the close relationship between these terms, but also how their different meanings can be applied to illuminate distinct characteristics of intentional movement behavior in sport, the paper scrutinizes two questions. These are:

i) What is it like to move intentionally, that is, with a certain intention?

ii) What is it like to move Intentionally, that is, with a certain directedness?

The first question is a paraphrased after Bratman's question: "what is it to act intentionally, or with a certain intention?" (1995: 375). Since intentions play an essential role in the performance of actions (Jacob 2003), the first question points in the direction of an ordinary understanding of intentional movement (i.e., intentional action). It is intended to lead one's thoughts into the philosophy of action. On the other hand, the second questions refers to the directedness of Intentional Movement and points therefore at a technical, philosophical understanding of Intentionality (Searle 1983; Moya 1990). The paper attempts to show that there is a systematic relationship between the ordinary sense of intentional movement and the technical sense of Intentional Movement, and moreover, that this relationship can play an essential role in how intentional movement behavior is understood and discussed in the sport research literature.


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